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A Law unto Itself? 
In an uncertain world, crisis demands executive action. And so 2005, a year 
of crisis, became a year of executive muscle-flexing, in response to crises 
ranging from Hurricane Katrina to avian flu to the Global War on Terror. In 
many ways, the legal debates generated were déjà vu all over again. Exorbitant 
claims of executive power in the War on Terror triggered the strongest clash 
since the Iran-Contra Affair between a constitutional vision of unchecked 
executive discretion bottomed on sweeping dicta in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.1 and a counter-vision of shared institutional powers 
symbolized by Justice Jackson’s canonical concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer:2 a clash of visions I discussed more than fifteen years ago.3 
But from this familiar debate, a new twist emerged: The startling notion 
that executive action is a law unto itself. The policy rationale for executive 
action, the President’s defenders argued, somehow created the legal justification 
for executive unilateralism. 
Take, for example, the surprising year-end revelation that the President 
had ordered the National Security Agency (NSA) to engage in nearly four years 
of secret, warrantless domestic surveillance of uncounted American citizens and 
residents, notwithstanding the statutory directive that wiretapping be 
conducted “exclusive[ly]” within the terms of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA).4 The Bush Administration first vociferously claimed 
the necessity of wiretapping telephone calls with al Qaeda, and later asserted 
that the necessity of executive action had legalized the program all along, 
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regardless of what the FISA says.5 Last January during Alberto Gonzales’s 
confirmation hearings–and before the NSA program came to light–Senator 
Russ Feingold asked the future Attorney General whether he believed the 
President could violate existing criminal laws and spy on U.S. citizens without 
a warrant. Mr. Gonzales answered that it was impossible to answer such a 
“hypothetical question,” but that it was “not the policy or the agenda of this 
president to authorize actions that would be in contravention of our criminal 
statutes.”6 When questioned about this during recent hearings on NSA 
surveillance, he answered that he had not misled the Congress, because once 
the President had authorized an action, it became legal under the President’s 
constitutional powers and thus could not contravene any criminal statutes.7 
Or take the debate over torture. In its infamous, now-overruled August 
2002 torture opinion, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel opined 
that even criminal prohibitions against torture do “not appl[y] to 
interrogations undertaken pursuant to [the President’s] Commander-in-Chief 
authority,” and that “[a]ny effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of 
battlefield combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the 
Commander-in-Chief authority in the President.”8 The opinion further 
suggested that executive officials can escape prosecution for torture on the 
ground that “they were carrying out the President’s Commander-in-Chief 
powers,” reasoning that such orders would preclude the application of a valid 
federal criminal statute “to punish officials for aiding the President in 
exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities.” 
Under intense public pressure, President Bush has now backed off such 
extreme claims, recently telling an interviewer: “I don’t think a president can . . 
. order torture, for example . . . . Yes, there are clear red lines . . . .”9 But his 
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actions have been far more ambiguous than his words. Congress 
overwhelmingly enacted the McCain Amendment to the Defense Authorization 
Act, which forbade U.S. officials from committing torture and cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment. But even after the President publicly endorsed the law, 
his presidential signing statement accompanying the Act made only a qualified 
commitment to follow the new law “in a manner consistent with the 
President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, including for the 
conduct of intelligence operations, and to supervise the unitary executive 
branch.”10 
All of this, of course, brings back eerie memories of Richard Nixon’s 
remark: “If the President does it, it’s not illegal.” But the more fitting quip may 
well be Henry Kissinger’s: “The illegal we do immediately. The 
unconstitutional takes a little longer.” 
Why does the unconstitutional take longer? Because, ironically, the 
executive branch usually asserts exorbitant claims of executive authority not at 
times of political strength, but rather, in times of intense political weakness. 
Executives usually assert unilateral power because they are unsure that 
Congress will endorse or that the courts will ratify what they feel pressured by 
circumstance to do. Witness, for example, Harry Truman seizing the steel mills 
during the unpopular Korean War, Richard Nixon’s illegal actions during 
Watergate, Ronald Reagan’s privatization of foreign policy during the Iran-
Contra Affair, or George W. Bush’s decision, amid plummeting popularity 
polls, to defend NSA domestic wiretapping. In each case, the executive branch 
asserted expansive constitutional justifications for unconstitutional actions, but 
the public’s acceptance of those claims eventually turned on whether the 
Congress acquiesced in, or the courts ultimately approved, the legality of the 
President’s claims. 
This point is emerging again in the surreal atmosphere now surrounding 
the current legislative debate in Washington. On a range of issues, the scope of 
the executive’s unilateral lawmaking power—and the power of the courts to 
review it—is once again before the Congress. Despite the Administration’s 
acknowledgement that only eight of the 535 Members of Congress were even 
partially briefed regarding the NSA domestic wiretapping, incredibly, 
Congress is now considering several proposals that would simply ratify the 
presidential warrantless wiretapping scheme, without most Members ever 
understanding the precise contours of past and ongoing wiretapping. With 
great fanfare, Congress reauthorized the USA PATRIOT Act, apparently 
oblivious to the fact that its legislative approval would be entirely redundant if 
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the Administration’s view of sweeping wartime presidential powers were 
correct. If the cryptic Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
resolution, enacted in September 2001, indeed authorizes the President to order 
torture and warrantless wiretaps–which are clearly prohibited by other 
statutes–then why should Congress even bother passing additional authorizing 
legislation? Under the President’s constitutional vision, whatever he ordered is 
already legal, ipse dixit. 
Even as Congress has schemed about new ways to evade meaningful 
authorization or oversight of executive action, it is also considering several new 
proposals to exclude or revise independent judicial review of executive conduct. 
Shortly after Congress adopted the McCain Amendment banning torture, it 
undermined its own actions by passing the Graham-Levin Amendment, which 
excludes judicial review of torture claims raised by detainees at Guantanamo. 
Senate proposals are now flying that would limit even further the independent 
FISA Court’s review of NSA wiretapping. And proposed immigration 
legislation would transfer exclusive jurisdiction over immigration appeals–
which have characteristically involved sensitive claims of personal liberty–from 
the generalist regional circuit courts that have traditionally heard such appeals 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which specializes in issues 
remote from immigration concerns, such as veterans’ claims, patents, and 
trademarks. 
In short, the unconstitutional takes longer than the illegal because it takes 
all three branches, not just one, to create a constitutional crisis. When the 
President overreaches, he can only remake the law to justify his actions if the 
Congress also disengages and the courts stay blinkered. But time has taught 
that speed and efficiency—the Executive’s greatest strengths—are not the only 
policy virtues. As Justice Brandeis wrote, the Framers gave us checks and 
balances “not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power.”11 
History teaches that Youngstown’s constitutional scheme of shared powers 
represents not just good law, but also good public policy. That scheme is 
designed not just to prevent the Executive from unilaterally rewriting the 
Constitution, but to prevent all three branches from escaping their 
constitutional duties. The engagement of all three branches tends to yield not 
just more thoughtful law, but a more broadly supported public policy. 
The Executive’s forte is action, not deliberative lawmaking. When the 
President tries to remake law by making policy, he usually fails at one or the 
other. When the executive acts alone and the other branches fall silent, the 
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legitimacy of the executive action too easily falls hostage to the vagaries of the 
executive’s shifting popularity polls. 
In sum, if “the President does it,” what makes his action legal is neither 
executive necessity nor the air of crisis that surrounds his response. It is the fact 
that others who do not work for him–particularly Congress and the courts–
have been genuinely consulted about his actions and, when they understand 
the facts, actually approve them in the eyes of the law. 
In times of crisis, all three branches–not just one–have a duty to respond. 
It is Congress’s job, in particular, not just to ratify hasty executive action, but 
to investigate, to understand the facts, and to pass workable framework 
legislation to avert future crises. After Vietnam and Watergate, Congress wisely 
seized that opportunity when it passed framework legislation such as FISA, but 
it shows no inclination to do so today. As Justice Jackson wrote in Youngstown, 
“[a] crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, 
challenges Congress.”12 The authority to write the law belongs not to the 
President acting alone, but is “in the hands of Congress.” But in the end, “only 
Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.” 
 
Harold Hongju Koh is Dean and Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor 
of International Law, Yale Law School. He is the author of many works on 
international law and national security, including The National Security 
Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair (1990). 
 
Preferred Citation: Harold Hongju Koh, A Law unto Itself?, 115 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 79 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/03/a_law_unto 
_itself.html. 
 
12.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
